Metalinguistic Value Disagreement by Rast, Erich Herrmann
ERICH RAST*
METALINGUISTIC VALUE DISAGREEMENT
 SU M M A RY: In a series of publications Burgess, Plunkett and Sundell have de-
veloped a metalinguistic negotiation view that they call ‘Conceptual Ethics.’ 
I argue that their position adequately captures our intuition that some cases 
of value disputes are metalinguistic, but that they reverse the direction of ju-
stification when they state that speakers ‘negotiate’ the best use of a term or 
concept on the basis of its prior social role. Borrowing ideas from Putnam 
(1975b), I instead suggest distinguishing two meanings of general terms and 
value predicates. Core meaning represents the lowest common denominator 
between speakers and is primarily based on our needs to coordinate behavior. 
In contrast to this, the noumenal meaning of a general term or value predica-
te is intended to capture an aspect of reality and represents what a term really 
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1 INTRODUCTION
Consider the following conversation: 
(1)  a. Alice: Capitalism is good. 
 b. Bob: No, it isn’t.
The dialogue illustrates an old conundrum of lexical semantics that 
has become important for a recent debate on relativism and contex-
tualism in the philosophy of language. Suppose Alice has a certain 
logical combination of criteria A
1
, …, An in mind that account for the 
truth-conditions of her use of ‘good’ in that particular case, but that 
Bob has a different logical combination of criteria B
1
, …, Bn in mind. 
They implicitly disagree about the meaning of that particular use of 
‘good’ in the given context. Then it seems that they are talking past 
each other, because Bob’s reply does not contradict the content of 
Alice’s assertion. He may agree with her about the question of whether 
capitalism satisfies criteria A
1
, …, An, but implicitly disagrees with her 
implicit assumption that these criteria provide an adequate lexical de-
composition of her particular use of ‘good’ in the given situation. The 
problem is to explain how such disagreements are possible, in which 
sense they are metalinguistic and in which sense they are substantial. 
Plunkett and Sundell (2013) argue that speakers can have substantial 
verbal disputes and discuss the following similar examples:1 
(2)  a. That chilly is spicy! 
 b. No, it’s not spicy at all!
(3)  a. Secretariat is an athlete. 
 b. Secretariat is not an athlete.2
(4)  a. Waterboarding is torture. 
 b. Waterboarding is not torture.
(5)   a. Lying with the aim of promoting human happiness is 
sometimes morally right. In fact it often is! 
  b. No, you are wrong. It is never morally right to lie in order 
to promote human happiness.
(6)  a. A tomato is a fruit. 
 b. No, a tomato is not a fruit.
1 See Plunkett and Sundell 2013, p. 15, 16, 19, 20, 22.
2 Two sports reporters are discussing a horse in a race. One is calling it an 
athlete, whereas the others point out that only humans can be athletes. This 
example is originally from Ludlow (2008). See Plunkett 2015, p. 840–845.
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Before going on, it is worth pointing out that there is an innocuous 
variant of these examples. Consider (1) again. Bob might associate the 
same criteria A
1
, …, An with Alice’s use of ‘good’ but disagree about 
the claim that capitalism satisfies them. I call this case the direct con-
tent-based disagreement.3 It is not problematic and will not be discussed 
further. Instead, I will discuss readings of the examples according to 
which Alice and Bob implicitly disagree about the right meaning or 
interpretation of the predicative complex in the given context, and 
maybe also disagree about the meaning of the logical subject of predi-
cation like ‘capitalism’ in (1).4 These readings give rise to a metalin-
guistic analysis like it has been suggested by Sundell (2011), Burgess 
(2013), Burgess and Plunkett (2013), Plunkett and Sundell (2013, 
2014), and Plunkett (2015). My central thesis is that although there 
are such metalinguistic disputes, Burgess, Plunkett and Sundell’s (in 
short: BPS) metalinguistic negotiation view (aka ‘Conceptual Ethics’) 
paints a skewed, or at least incomplete, picture of them. According to 
BPS, it is often not the existing social role or function of the expres-
sions under consideration that motivates the dispute, but the speakers’ 
concern with a shared reality. In that respect, I shall argue, metalin-
guistic value disputes are not substantially different from many other 
disputes about general terms, singular terms for abstract objects and 
their corresponding predicate expressions.
2 APPROACHES TO VALUE DISAGREEMENT
There are some semantic positions in the philosophy of language 
that need to be mentioned to put the current debate into the proper 
historical perspective, even though I agree with BPS they ultimately 
3 By ‘content’ I mean content in the sense of Kaplan’s character/content dis-
tinction, that is, the notion of semantic content that is the result of saturating 
indexicals and evaluated with respect to circumstances of evaluation. The above 
characterization does not necessarily apply to broader notions of semantic content 
which may have their place in other approaches. What is important for the current 
purpose is that Alice and Bob disagree on the basis of the same meaning and the 
same contextual resolution of indexical expressions.
4 To keep things simple, I will assume in what follows that the meaning of 
either the logical subject expression or the predicative complex is fixed. In 
principle, however, a metalinguistic dispute can be about both expressions at the 
same time.
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fail as an adequate explanation of the types of disputes in examples 
like the ones above. 
2.1 CONTEXTUALISM
First, what Alice and Bob have ‘in mind’ in example (1) could be 
spelled out in contextualist terms in a framework based on Kaplan 
(1989). In a context with Alice as evaluator, the semantic content of (1–a) 
would yield a semantic content with her criteria, whereas in a context 
with Bob as evaluator the semantic content would contain his criteria. 
However one spells out the details of this approach, it does not seem 
to be adequate in general, though, since it merely restates the problem 
in a particular contextualist framework: According to this semantics 
Alice and Bob associate different semantic contents with Alice’s original 
utterance, and so they do not really disagree and are talking past each 
other. Whatever attitude Bob has about his content could be compat-
ible with any attitude about her content, and vice versa.
2.2 RELATIVISM
Second, as a solution to this problem a relativist semantics could 
be given, as it has been defended for predicates of personal taste and 
even evaluative language in general by various authors such as Kölbel 
(2002), Lasersohn (2005), MacFarlane (2005, 2014), and Egan (2014). 
There are many different brands of relativism and trying to charac-
terize all of them would go beyond the scope of this article. Generally 
speaking, a typical assessment-relativist approach to value disagree-
ment would stipulate that the same semantic content of (1) may be 
true with respect to Alice as a judge and false with respect to Bob as 
a judge. 
Could this type of relativism be a solution to the problem of how 
to explain value disputes like (1)? As far as I know, nobody has ever 
seriously considered such semantics for disputes that are clearly val-
ue-based such as (1), (4), and (5), and with good reason. According to 
assessment-relativist semantics, the use of ‘good’ would be interpret-
ed as ‘good relative to a judge’ – though not as part of the semantic 
content, but as part of the semantic evaluation mechanism. There 
are many metaethical theories with which this view is compatible, for 
example some forms of (ideal) appraiser subjectivism, but there are 
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also many moral theories with which it is plain incompatible such as 
value-absolutist readings of nonrelational good. Assessment-relativism 
of ‘good’ excludes those metaethical stances.
By the same token, a contextualist semantics for ‘good’ that always 
stipulates a hidden argument place for a benefactor would exclude 
any metaethical stance that asserts that certain uses of ‘good’ can be 
nonrelational, stating that ‘x is good’ is true if and only if x is good at 
the time of utterance, false otherwise.
This raises a question: Can the semanticist tell moral philoso-
phers that they are wrong? There can certainly be scenarios in which 
a semanticist may inform a moral philosopher that there is a logical 
problem with a certain moral conception or that it does not conform 
with what speakers ordinarily associate with the meaning of given 
value terms, and there are metaethical stances like quasi-realism 
whose express purpose is to make prima facie implausible metaethical 
theories compatible with semantics and our common-sense intuitions. 
In general, however, the answer must be No. Semantics can put weight 
and pressure on certain philosophical constructions but cannot decide 
them. If semantics provided a knockdown argument to a certain moral 
stance, for instance, then it would be moral philosophy in disguise, and 
the same can be said about any other claims of priority over domain-
specific knowledge. For example, semantics cannot tell us whether 
atoms can be split or not. I will come back to this topic later.
In addition to this general worry, relativism also seems to be 
generally less plausible than ordinary contextualism, because it needs 
to come up with a complicated story to explain uses of value terms 
that explicitly involve a benefactor PP of the form ‘for X’, like in the 
following examples: 
(7)  Alice: Capitalism is good [for us].
(8)  Alice: This sandwich is tasty [for the customers].
In both cases, it is not hard to come up with a scenario in which 
the PP with the benefactor needs to be inferred from the context. For 
example, in (8) it could be part of the common ground that Alice is 
a cynical chain restaurant manager who despises their own sandwich-
es and talks about the new product line for the customers. Examples like 
this are hard to explain from a purely relativist stance because they 
seem to require, at least in the most straightforward setting, a way 
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to accommodate the content of the PP at the level of Logical Form, 
which should propagate into the semantic content – which prima facie 
conflicts with the plain relativist semantics. But even if this problem 
can be solved technically, the general philosophical worry about ex-
pressions like ‘good’ in (7) is that these have clear-cut absolute uses, as 
the following variant of (1) indicates: 
(9)  a. Alice: Capitalism is good. 
 b. Bob: You mean for yourself? 
 c.  Alice: No, I meant good {for us / in general / for everyone / 
for our country / for you / simpliciter / …}.
In light of the many options, claiming that ‘good’ is ‘good for the 
speaker’ or ‘good for (some) assessor’ by default seems philosophi-
cally dubious.5 For ‘good’ in particular an ambiguity thesis that stip-
ulates both a relational and nonrelational meaning seems more 
appealing, but even if only relational uses are allowed, then an index-
icalist position according to which the benefactor is present as an open 
argument place that can be filled by a PP, or bound from the context, 
would explain examples like (9–c) much better. The burden of proof 
is on the relativist here, and at the same time there is nothing philo-
sophically compelling about a relativist semantics for evaluative terms 
in general, even though it may be adequate for certain predicates of 
personal taste in spite of examples like (8).
2.3 SOCIAL EXTERNALISM TO THE RESCUE?
Putting relativism aside as being both empirically and philosophi-
cally unsatisfying, let me turn to general error theories. The kind of 
error theory I have in mind is not the one by Mackie (1977), but rather 
one based on some exaggerated form of social externalism. In this 
view, both Alice and Bob in (1) have the wrong lexical decomposition 
in mind, they are both wrong about the ‘correct’ meaning of her par-
ticular use of ‘good’ in the given conversational situation. Instead, like 
with ‘elm’ or ‘arthritis’, experts on goodness fix the meaning of ‘good’ 
in examples like (1). Maybe Alice agrees with the experts, maybe Bob 
agrees with the experts, but they might also both be mistaken if they 
5 Note that benefactor and assessor need not be the same and that the for-PP 
is primarily used to indicate a benefactor.
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are themselves not experts on ‘good’. Whatever they have in mind, 
according to the proposed view Alice’s utterance ultimately means 
whatever the experts on goodness and democracy explain it means. 
I argue in the next section that this account is more plausible than 
it might seem at first glance, but in the crude form presented so far 
it remains unacceptable. As Plunkett and Sundell (2013, p. 26–28) 
lay out, it is implausible to presume that experts generally fix the 
meaning of value terms, as they are the ones who most persistently 
disagree about these terms. Moreover, there may be no experts on 
‘good’ and we also disagree about who counts as an expert. Would 
that be me or the Pope? Who decides? The problem becomes even 
more apparent with example (4). Who counts as an expert on torture? 
The one who tortures a lot? Donald Rumsfeld? Moral philosophers 
in general, or one in particular? Legal experts? To cut a long story 
short, although social externalism probably plays an important role in 
settling certain factual matters about ‘elms’ and the biological contexts 
in which a ‘tomato’ definitely is a fruit, it is implausible as a general 
solution to metalinguistic value disputes.
2.4 SEMANTIC PRIMITIVISM 
There are two more interesting and influential responses to the 
problems raised by examples of metalinguistic value disagreement. 
The first one is semantic primitivism. As I understand this position, it 
states that value terms are not lexically decomposable in the sense that 
the predicates into which the term is decomposed exhaustively define 
the meaning of the value term.6 For ‘good’ this position can be attrib-
uted to Moore (1903). In Moore’s opinion ‘good’ cannot be defined 
by separate criteria, as I have suggested in the initial example, but 
6 Moore does not claim that a decomposition of ‘good’ and similar value terms 
in the sense of providing dictionary definitions is not possible, but rather that 
such a definition never provides a fully satisfying analysis of the term. This is 
compatible with the claim that a dictionary definition provides ‘the’ meaning of 
the term in question. However, in a truth-conditional setting does it follow from 
Moore’s thesis that the decomposition does not exhaustively represent the truth-
conditional contribution of the term and that the term must therefore have some 
primitive meaning in addition to whatever decomposition one proposes. I would 
like to thank an anonymous reviewer for comments that helped in making this 
formulation and the subsequent passage more precise.
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rather has some primitive meaning. Words like ‘good’ are in Moore’s 
view very similar to color predicates like ‘yellow’. Although ‘good’ 
may be given some explanation in the form of a dictionary entry, 
this decomposition in Moore’s opinion does not define the meaning 
of ‘good’. In the more general context of contemporary truth-condi-
tional semantics (which was of no concern to Moore), semantic prim-
itivism asserts that a decomposition only explicates its meaning but 
does not deliver its full truth-conditional contribution. Consequent-
ly, there cannot really be any metalinguistic disagreement about such 
terms, at least not a form of disagreement that could be settled by 
a dispute about which lexical decomposition represents the correct or 
adequate meaning for a particular use of the term. Maybe speakers 
could resolve the disagreement in other ways, by pointing to instances 
of good things, for example, just like you may point to yellow objects 
in order to teach someone who speaks a language that does not have 
a lexically realized predicate for yellow what English ‘yellow’ means.7 
But it seems more plausible in such an account to stipulate that one 
or both of the speakers in value disputes like (1) fail to recognize the 
primitive property of being good that corresponds to Alice’s use of 
‘good’ or disagree about the question whether capitalism falls under 
it. In the first case one or both speakers are not fully competent and 
in the second case the disagreement is directly content-based. In both 
cases, the disagreement is not metalinguistic and our intuition has 
been explained away that value disputes like (1), (4) and (5) are at 
least partially about the terms involved. 
The ‘Paradox of Analysis’ and Moore’s Open Question argument 
have been used to argue for that position, and there is also a general 
worry that semantic decomposition could lead to a definitory vicious 
circle. Many attempts of defusing the ‘paradox of analysis’ have been 
made such as, for instance, Neo-Fregean approaches first proposed 
by Church (1946) and laid out in detail by Jacquette (1990), and since 
I believe that all of them are more or less successful and that there 
is no paradox, I will not further discuss the Paradox of Analysis in 
general here. The more specific open question argument is based on 
7 There are obvious concerns based on Quine (1964) about such an attempt, 
but we can ignore these for the sake of the argument. There are better reasons to 
reject Moore’s conception that will be laid out below shortly.
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the idea that one would need to justify any given decomposition for 
a use of ‘good’ into a logical combination of other criteria why the ap-
plication of these criteria counts as good. For example, if being good 
is analyzed as whatever is commendable, one would have to ask the 
question why whatever is commendable counts as being good, thereby 
reasoning in circles. This is another version of the alleged paradox 
and in my point of view no more convincing than other formulations 
of it. On the contrary, if we explicate the meaning of a particular use 
of ‘good’, then we do not have to ask the additional question why the 
logical decomposition counts as being good, since that decomposition 
already explicates the meaning of that use of ‘good’. The individual 
parts of such an explication do not even have to count as good, just as 
in an analysis of ‘capitalism’ each of the individual characteristics that 
together constitute a capitalist economic system do not themselves have 
to be counted as capitalist. When a general term, predicate, or term for 
an abstract object is explicated by semantic decomposition, then that 
complex meaning is constituted by the network of constraints of its 
individual parts and inferences that can be drawn from them within 
a holistic network of other such specifications of lexical meanings, much 
in the way computational ontologies work. Even if individual entities of 
such an ontology form part of another, more fine-grained ontology or 
are related in some systematic ways with another ontology, this does not 
constitute a vicious circle. Instead, the purpose and theoretical goals of 
the semantic analysis or explication dictates, from a practical point of 
view, how many levels of decomposition are appropriate and whether 
relations to other ontologies need to be explored. For semantics in 
general the very first level of decomposition is adequate; for a more 
philosophical analysis it is possible that further fine-grained analyses 
and ontological reductions would be more suitable. Much more would 
have to be said about this reply to semantic primitivism, but for lack 
of space I would like to leave it as is. This critique does not imply that 
there cannot be any primitive concepts, although perhaps their primi-
tiveness is always relative to a given ontology.8 
Let me end this section on semantic primitivism by pointing out 
that the burden of proof is on the primitivists side, and at least for 
value predicates their story seems unconvincing. Apart from more 
8 I would like to remain agnostic about this issue in this article.
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general philosophical arguments against Moore on ‘good’ such as 
Geach (1956), there is also pervasive linguistic evidence that many, 
if not most, evaluative predicates are multidimensional, which puts 
them further at odds with a semantic primitivism that does not take 
into account multiple dimensions as part of the primitive meaning.9
2.5 METALINGUISTIC NEGOTIATION
A more compelling position takes the metalinguistic aspect of the 
examples discussed seriously. Burgess, Plunkett and Sundell have 
proposed a position they call ‘Conceptual Ethics’ in a series of papers 
with exactly that aim – see Burgess (2013), Burgess and Plunkett 
(2013), Plunkett and Sundell (2013), Plunkett and Sundell (2014), 
and Plunkett (2015). In their opinion, the disagreement in examples 
(2)–(6) is metalinguistic and they call the activity of discussing and de-
termining how we should use words or concepts ‘conceptual ethics’, 
because it concerns normative issues. Such disputes are often worth 
having, they argue at length, because they are based on a concept’s “…
sociological facts about its sociological role” (Plunkett, Sundell 2013, 
p. 25), because there is something “…substantive at stake in how the 
relevant terms are used in the context […] and the speakers recognize 
this fact” (ibid.). As they lay out, these disputes also survive paraphras-
ing, a test devised by Chalmers (2011) to distinguish substantive from 
merely verbal disputes, so metalinguistic disagreement need not be 
merely verbal. According to their view, “…certain words (largely in-
dependent of which specific concept they express) fill specific and 
important functional roles in our practices” (Plunkett, Sundell 2013, 
p. 20), and discourse participants negotiate the best use of a term or 
concept on the basis of these existing functional roles. As Plunkett puts 
it, “[…] a metalinguistic negotiation […] is a dispute in which speakers 
each use (rather than mention) a term to advocate for a normative 
view about how that term should be used” (Plunkett 2015, p. 832). 
9 See Kennedy (1999), Kennedy and McNally (2005), Sassoon (2013), Sassoon 
and Fadlon (2017), McNally and Stojanovic (2017). It is unclear in which sense 
a meaning based on multiple dimensions could still be regarded as primitive, 
since it needs to somehow take into account different qualitative or quantitative 
orderings and their aggregation. In contrast to this, Moore considers ‘good’ to 
stand for a unary, natural predicate like ‘yellow’ does, for example.
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A new area on this position is the attempt to combine a metalin-
guistic nature of disputes with the idea that these disputes are nev-
ertheless substantial and worth having. However, despite the many 
examples they discuss, the function of the sociological role of a term 
or concept under discussion remains problematic in their approach. 
Suppose Alice presumes the definition of ‘torture’ preferred by the 
UN under which waterboarding would clearly fall under this concept, 
and Bob prefers the US definition that focuses on physical harm. 
Consider first that the prior sociological role of a word like ‘torture’ 
somehow could settle the dispute, i.e., plays the role of a corrigens and 
helps decide which is the ‘right’ definition. Then in a society in which 
torture is accepted and not sanctioned at all, waterboarding would be 
equally acceptable. So if the existing functional role ultimately settles 
the question, then Bob should have no problem with the UN defini-
tion, as long as he agrees with the existing practices, i.e., the lack of 
sanctions in this case. But it seems clear to me that this is not at all 
what Alice and Bob’s are discussing in (4), the question under discus-
sion in Alice’s utterance is whether waterboarding is torture, irrespec-
tive of the existing social role of sanctioning torture. Consider second 
that the existing role does not settle the dispute in any way. Then it 
is not clear how the existing social role of ‘torture’ – that it is illegal, 
sanctioned, reprehensible, etc., in any civilized society – can help any 
of the discourse participants with their positions and why they do not 
merely talk past each other if they base their views on different defini-
tions of what constitutes torture. Alice wants waterboarding to classify 
as torture, because she wants it to be sanctioned, and Bob does not 
want waterboarding to classify as torture, because he does not want it 
to be sanctioned. Since the social role does not settle the dispute in this 
scenario, they continue to talk past each other by propagating their 
favorite definition on the basis of different wants and desires.
It seems that a mixed approach is the most promising: The existing 
social and more broadly conceived functional role of a term or concept 
serves as a guideline for discussion, it partly settles the matter but 
in borderline cases a metalinguistic negotiation turns into a genuine 
value dispute.10 The idea is perhaps that waterboarding is intuitively 
10 See Plunkett (2015, p. 851–852, 867) about mixed cases in other kinds of 
metalinguistic disputes.
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no less reprehensible than another, similar practices that have already 
been classified as torture, and so it should also be regarded as torture.
However, upon some reflection it becomes clear that this line 
of reasoning is fallacious and that neither Alice nor Bob should or 
would want to argue that way. Alice could attempt to argue that wa-
terboarding is torture because waterboarding is morally reprehensible 
and should be sanctioned, but that would make for a lousy argument. 
She could also argue that waterboarding is morally reprehensible and 
should be sanctioned, but for that argument she does not necessarily 
need to refer to torture at all and so it cannot represent the metalin-
guistic dispute in the example. It is simply another dispute. Instead, 
she needs to argue, if she intends to convince Bob rationally, that there 
is something wrong with the US definition, that it does not capture all 
aspects of what we commonly conceive as torture, and in a second 
step, that waterboarding sufficiently elicits many of these aspects for it 
to qualify as torture in this sense. She may then go on to explain that 
this concept of torture is faithfully represented by the UN definition, 
but this is again a separate issue. So what is under dispute really is the 
question whether waterboarding is torture, and only in a second step, 
she may intend to convey pragmatically, by stating (4–a), that it should 
also be sanctioned like torture.
Generally speaking, under normal circumstances the social practices 
associated with a value term result from the evaluative component of 
the value term and not the other way around. By regarding the meta-
linguistic dispute as an instance of negotiation, Burgess, Plunkett and 
Sundell reverse this direction of justification. That is in my opinion 
the main problem with their ‘Conceptual Ethics’, which otherwise ad-
equately reflects our intuition that the dialogues in question are cases 
of genuine metalinguistic disputes worth having.11 
11 Sundell (2016) defends an even stronger thesis, that all value disputes can be 
explained as metalinguistic negotiation. This is criticized by Marques (2017), and 
apart from some assumptions about what counts as a possible explanation of value 
disputes (ibid., 42–43) that I consider too strong, I agree with her main objection 
that metalinguistic negotiation is neither necessary nor sufficient to have a value 
dispute and therefore cannot serve as the only explanation of value disputes. 
However, this critique only concerns the stronger thesis and not the weaker claim 
of Plunkett and Sundell (2013), Burgess and Plunkett (2013) , and Plunkett (2015) 
that many cases of value disagreement are metalinguistic. In my opinion, there 
is (at least) direct value disagreement, metalinguistic value disagreement based 
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In the next section I would like to offer a précis of their position 
that builds on this insight but brings something important back that 
metalinguistic negotiation, on the basis of an existing social role, 
cannot deliver: reality, insofar as it goes beyond social reality. I will also 
argue that metalinguistic disputes of the kind discussed so far occur 
in many other areas as well, almost inevitably whenever certain predi-
cates, general terms and terms for abstract objects are involved, and 
that these types of disputes are a completely normal aspect of natural 
language use. They are part of the ordinary uses and functions of 
natural languages. 
3 CORE MEANING AND NOUMENAL MEANING
Putnam’s seminal article The Meaning of ‘Meaning’ is famously 
known for his Twin Earth thought experiment, but Putnam (1975b) 
also put forward a positive solution to the puzzle based on what he 
called ‘meaning vectors’. This proposal is relevant to the above discus-
sion. To quickly recap what it was about: A meaning vector contains 
syntactic and semantic markers, a stereotype in the sense laid out by 
Putnam (1975a), and a description of the external content of a term. 
For example, ‘water’ is a mass noun for a dispersed liquid substance 
with a stereotype that could be paraphrased as ‘a drinkable colorless 
liquid essential for all life on earth’ (the details or adequacy of this 
description do not matter here). In addition, the meaning vector 
contains ‘H
2
O’ as a description of the external content of ‘water’, and 
as Putnam argued, the twin earth scenario shows that the meaning of 
‘water’ cannot be adequately represented by the markers and a stereo-
type alone. However, Putnam (1975b) made it clear that in order to 
count as a competent speaker you do not have to know the externalist 
on semantic underdeterminacy, which I lay out further below, and implicit value 
disagreement that I have investigated in detail […] and that forms the basis of 
Marques’s main counter-argument against Sundell (2016); see Marques (2016, 
p. 47). However, if the central thesis of this article is correct, then there may be 
many more types of value disagreement anyway, since the noumenal meaning of 
value predicates is not fixed and people can endorse many different competing 
metaethical stances. Hence, the project of finding the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for an adequate explanation of any type of value disagreement seems 
to be doomed from the start.
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content of a term, or otherwise nobody would have used the term 
competently before the rise of modern chemistry, and let us also not 
forget that at least in theory, as a remote possibility, it could happen 
that our views about chemistry are fundamentally mistaken and that 
water will turn out to be XYZ in the future. 
Based on Putnam’s proposal my suggestion is as follows. There is 
a core meaning that corresponds to the stereotype in his view. Mastery 
of this core meaning, be it implicit knowledge or an ability, is required 
by virtue of linguistic competence, but speakers only need to loosely 
converge on this type of meaning. It represents the lowest common 
denominator between competent speakers and primarily serves the 
purpose of communicating in order to solve cooperation problems. 
This type of meaning can be described in terms of truth-conditions 
like any kind of meaning, since the question of whether one should 
develop a truth-conditional semantics, as opposed to another type of 
semantics, primarily concerns methodology.12 However, this type of 
meaning need not be truth-conditionally complete in the sense that 
the contribution of the core meaning of an expression to the whole 
meaning of the utterance will automatically make the utterance fully 
truth-conditionally evaluable. In a truth-conditional setting, the whole 
utterance may turn out to be a propositional skeleton (Bach 2004). 
In a more general understanding of meaning theory, geometrical ap-
proaches like Prototype Theory (Rosch 1983) and Conceptual Spaces 
(Gärdenfors 2000) may be more adequate for this type of meaning, 
because even though it is mandated by linguistic competence in 
a realistic approach different speakers will only converge imprecisely 
about a common core meaning.13 
There is another kind of meaning that can be regarded a gen-
eralization of Putnam’s specification of externalist content. I call it 
noumenal meaning, because it is directed towards external reality 
12 From the point of view of (desirable) methodological pluralism this is not 
a very good question. See Dekker (2011) for a defense of methodological pluralism 
in semantics.
13 There are open problems with the logical combination of geometri-
cal meanings and quantification, so these approaches cannot really serve as 
full replacements, but some advances have been made, see for example Aerts 
et al. (2013) and Lawry and Lewis (2016). Note further that a truth-condition-
al approach based on ‘loose bundles’ or propositional skeletons with nearness 
measures defined between them will face similar problems.
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while at the same time not necessarily corresponding to something 
that exists in reality. In the case of natural kind terms that Putnam 
discusses in response to Kripke (1972) the noumenal meaning 
coincides with a description of externalist content and only denotes 
the natural kind provided that our current scientific theory is correct 
– the actual extension is fixed indexically. In his theory, Putnam does 
not need an externalist description of the extension of other general 
terms. In contrast to this, I understand noumenal meaning as that 
kind of meaning that reflects what a general term really means, i.e., 
it is intended to single out some particular aspect of reality that I call 
noumenon, following a long tradition in philosophy The noumenal 
meaning of ‘water’ is arguably H
2
O, and the noumenon is H
2
O in this 
case, provided that our current knowledge of physics and chemistry 
is correct. But it is important to realize that the story of Putnam-style 
semantic externalism cannot be extended to general terms and value 
predicates in general. Indexicalist externalism may be adequate for 
proper names and natural kind terms on the basis of current assump-
tions about science, whereas the meaning of other terms such as ‘phlo-
giston’ cannot be explained by reference to the actual world – phlo-
giston does not exist and consequently there is nothing like H
2
O that 
represents its physical microstructure. 
Going beyond what Putnam stated when he laid out his version 
of externalism, I would like to suggest now that according to the way 
we talk, in our actual linguistic practice, we commonly assume that 
expressions have a noumenal meaning that describes, singles out or 
otherwise captures an aspect of reality, but that we also often disagree 
about this meaning, and that this explains the above kind of metalin-
guistic disputes about value terms. Simply put, judging from the way 
we talk and the way language is supposed to work, we are all external-
ists by default but at the same time often disagree about what lexical 
decomposition of a term adequately describes an aspect of reality – 
and we even disagree about what counts as reality itself, one may add 
though, I will not address this more philosophical concern any further 
in what follows. 
Take for instance the general term ‘atom’. Its contemporary core 
meaning is something like ‘extremely small building block of matter 
which can bundle together with similar building blocks to form 
molecules and is often depicted like a tiny solar system but is in fact way 
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more complicated’. Something like this. Its noumenal meaning used 
to be ‘particle-like smallest indivisible building block of matter’, but at 
some point there was disagreement about this lexical decomposition. 
Nature has informed us that atoms are divisible, so something with the 
original definition must have been wrong and the noumenal meaning 
had to be revised. In turn, this has likely triggered a revision of the 
core meaning, but probably rather slowly, because everyday talk was 
not under strong pressure to conform with reality in this case. It is our 
strife to get reality right that primarily motivates such disagreements. 
Value disagreements like (1), (4), and (5) do not substantially 
differ from other cases of implicit or explicit metalinguistic disagree-
ment. They are implicit in the examples but could be made explicit 
by a discourse participant at any time by asking questions like “What 
do you mean by ‘good’?” or “How do you define ‘torture’?” Under 
normal circumstances we strive for reality in such disputes on the basis 
of a presumed shared existing core meaning when we realize that the core 
meaning does not adequately capture reality in the context of the dis-
cussion. If we do not realize this, on the other hand, then there will 
be no explicit metalinguistic disagreement. As mentioned earlier, core 
meaning often suffices for our communicative purposes. There is no 
need to know exactly what the nature of time is when you ask “What 
time is it?” and want to catch the 18:30h train. I once ordered two 
tickets for a public outdoor swimming pool by uttering “Two tickets for 
normal adults, please.” and the attendant answered: “Well, what does 
‘normal’ really mean?” The joke was successful, because no noumenal 
meaning was under discussion; the core meaning sufficed for the co-
operative behavior of selling and buying a ticket without any perks. 
Although sometimes noumenal meaning depends on the larger 
theoretical context, for example definitions of ‘normal’ in the statisti-
cal sense versus ‘normal’ in the sense of a prototype, and sometimes 
operational definitions based on primarily practical considerations 
may be more or less appropriate and partly negotiable, noumenal 
meaning is generally directed towards reality and we generally intend 
it to be directed towards reality. We talk about numbers as if there was 
a Platonic realm of numbers, about values as if there were absolute 
values that we somehow perceive or intuit, and some of us talk about 
a particular god as if he or she existed. As the case of ‘phlogiston’ 
or ‘Vulcan’ reveal, however, the fact that we commonly assume that 
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certain expressions have a noumenal meaning does not imply that this 
meaning picks out a corresponding aspect of reality. 
How does this theory explain value disagreement? The main dif-
ference to the contextualist position is that in a dual aspect theory 
linguistically competent speakers do agree on the core meaning and 
therefore never merely talk past each other. At the same time they 
do not merely negotiate how to best modify concepts in a way that 
suits prior social roles, though. Their disagreement can be about 
the noumenal meaning of value terms, which is not necessarily part 
of a shared lexicon, although experts may agree on the noumenal 
meaning of many expressions within their area. For value terms there 
may not be any such widespread agreement even among experts, 
but the way in which different speakers argue for and justify specific 
lexical decompositions that are supposed to reflect what a value term 
really means, i.e. decompositions representing noumenal meaning, is 
generally directed towards reality. 
Finally, I would like to turn to the question of whether noumenal 
meaning is meaning at all, for an obvious critique off such a dual aspect 
theory is that only a core meaning is genuine meaning, since noumenal 
meaning is not required by linguistic competence and need not be 
shared or fixed. I believe this question to be ill-conceived, though, 
since Plunkett and Sundell (2013) and Plunkett (2015) show convinc-
ingly that many examples of metalinguistic disputes are clearly about 
the meaning of the terms involved. Should it be regarded as linguistic 
meaning? The answer can only be Yes, because noumenal meaning is 
associated with and tied to the terms involved, and by their existing 
core meaning also connected with the existing social role of a term. If 
the candidate for a noumenal meaning of a term deviates too far from 
its social role or core meaning, then we get jargon or technical defini-
tions, or the candidate will be rejected. However, noumenal meaning is 
not linguistic in the sense of being understood by competent speakers 
on the basis of a shared lexicon, and for certain predicates, general 
terms, and terms for abstract objects there is also an important differ-
ence to Putnam’s specifications of externalist content: When speakers 
dispute what an expression really means, then they need to have 
their own candidate for the noumenal meaning of that expression ‘in 
mind’, however that is spelled out in the detail; only then can the dis-
agreement be considered implicitly or explicitly metalinguistic.
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4 SUMMARY
How much does my proposal differ from Conceptual Ethics? 
Plunkett readily concedes that on the surface many metalinguistic 
disputes look like object-level discourse14 and that it is possible that 
“[…] issues in conceptual ethics are settled by fully objective, mind-in-
dependent normative facts […] or that they are largely settled by facts 
about what the objective joints of reality really are […]” (Plunkett 2015, 
p. 860/1) while at the same time disputing “[…] the interpretation that 
takes them to be canonical disputes centered at object-level issues.” 
(ibid., p. 867) However, as I have laid out above, BPS also focus on 
the social role of expressions and regard metalinguistic dispute cases 
of negotiating the best use of a term or concept, where they tend to 
couple the best use to a certain social role or function propagated by 
a discourse participant. I have argued that this way of looking at these 
disputes is inadequate in general, because it ultimately cannot explain 
why they are rational and substantive. If discourse participants merely 
battle their conflicting wants and desires of how to connect a term 
with some concept on the basis of an existing or a desired social role 
of that term, then they continue to talk past each other. So although 
BPS agree that some metalinguistic disputes might be based on the 
factual question whether the concepts used are more or less adequate 
to capture a relevant aspect of reality, their metalinguistic negotiation 
view emphasizes a normative aspect of these disputes that tends to 
make them irrational and mostly rhetoric. Instead, my suggestion is to 
take the ‘best’ in ‘best use of a term or concept’ to primarily mean ‘best 
from an epistemic point of view’, from the point of view of the theory 
of sciences, since in the end a general term has to capture a relevant 
aspect of reality adequately in order to be useful for theorizing about 
the world and for our conceptual systems.
To describe this general aspect of metalinguistic disputes in more 
detail, I have suggested, based on Putnam (1975b) and augment-
ing his original suggestion, that lexical meaning principally has two 
different aspects. When using sentences with general terms or terms 
for abstract objects speakers often implicitly or explicitly disagree about 
their noumenal meaning, since not even experts can be convincingly 
14 See Plunkett (2015, p. 828–830).
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said to be able to determine what the respective terms really mean. 
This disagreement, however, always takes place on the basis of a prior 
agreement about the core meaning of the expressions involved, which is 
the meaning that is required by virtue of linguistic competence. When 
we use value terms like ‘good’ and value-laden terms like ‘torture’ we 
do not always know what these really mean in the given context of 
use, but we have a prior loose understanding of their core meaning. 
Disagreement about the noumenal meaning of terms is based on our 
strife to capture important aspects of reality that often go beyond the 
existing social function of these expressions associated with the core 
meaning. These types of disagreements are metalinguistic, because 
they implicitly concern the meaning of linguistic expressions. They 
can be substantial not only because of the prior social role of those 
expressions but also because our conceptual systems may capture 
relevant aspects of reality more or less adequately, and this adequacy 
is contested in corresponding metalinguistic disputes.
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